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Abstract: 
 
Extant views of (shareholder) value, (corporate) governance, and  competitiveness 
have a narrow view of ‘agency’, a poorly developed theory of value and pay little 
attention  to  sustainability.    In  this  paper  we  develop  a  perspective  on  the 
determinants of value-wealth creation at the firm, meso-, and national levels, explore 
the limitations of extant theory of the firm, concerning governance and value in its 
context,  and  discuss  some  prerequisites  of  sustainability.    We  conclude  that  the 
pursuit of value is not antithetical to, but it derives from, the notion of sustainability, 
that sustainability requires both internal and external controls and that institutional 
diversity  can  help  effect  mutual  ‘stewardship’  and  monitoring.  Moreover,  for 




Keywords: institutions, agency, governance, sustainability, value 
 
   3 
I. Introduction 
 
Despite long-standing and often heated debates on shareholder value and sustainable 
economic growth, as well as the role of corporations and their governance in 
effecting both, the relationship between all of these has been little examined.  The 
very terms involved are inadequately developed and thus often misunderstood, 
misinterpreted or perceived differently by different economic agents.  We try to 
address these problems in this short essay.  In section II, we discuss the meaning of 
value in general and shareholder value in particular; the relationship between value 
and economic growth; and extant views on the role of firms and corporate 
governance in effecting these.  Having pointed out limitations in section III, we build 
on these views to provide a perspective on the determinants and agents of value-
wealth creation, and discuss the role of shareholder value, (corporate) governance 
and economic growth in this context.  Conclusions follow in section IV. 
 
II. The Nature and Determinants of Value and Wealth and the Role of 
Corporate Governance 
 
Two major theories have been developed on the nature of value.  The classical theory 
of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, which attributes ‘value’ to cost of production, in 
particular labour power expended to produce a commodity (‘labour theory of value’); 
and the ‘neoclassical’, marginalist notion of ‘value’ of Jevons, Menger and others, 
who consider value the perceived ‘utility’ provided by  a good to an economic agent.  
‘Utility’, in turn, is affected by ‘scarcity’. (see Dobb, 1973).   
 
The determinants of value-wealth creation was the theme of the founding father of 
economics, Adam Smith. In his Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith attributed the 
wealth-creating abilities of market economies to the “visible hand” of the firm and 
the “invisible hand” of the market. In analysing his “pin factory”, Smith observed 
how specialisation, the division of labour, teamwork and invention, create value and 
generate dramatic productivity enhancements. The marvels of the “visible hand” are 
enhanced further by the “invisible hand” of the market – the free interplay of demand 
and supply by economic agents in pursuit of their own interest. The invisible hand 
helps provide information, incentives, co-ordination, and realise value through   4 
exchange. Competition can ensure that “natural” prices will tend to emerge. 
Restrictive practices by, for example, “people of the same trade” will endanger this 
result, calling for restraint and/or regulation.  
 
In this tradition, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) later emphasised the role of innovation 
and creative destruction as a determinant of economic performance. Edith Penrose 
(1959) reinvented but also extended the classical tradition, by explaining firm 
endogenous growth through intra-firm knowledge-creation, leading to “excess 
resources”, an incentive for growth. Building on Penrose, Richardson (1972) has 
pointed to the ubiquitous nature of inter-firm co-operation, in forms other than price-
collusion. 
 
In the classical tradition, international wealth creation and convergence may follow 
from David Ricardo's theory of “comparative advantage”; a result predicated, 
however, on the absence of increasing returns (see below). 
 
In the neoclassical tradition, the focus shifts from value-creation in production and 
realisation in markets, to exchange relationships, subjective value and efficiency in 
resource allocation. The aim of economics becomes one of “economising”, of 
rational choices between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses, 
(Robbins, 1935). Given scarcity, rationality and the need for economising, the 
economic aim becomes one of achieving an efficient allocation of scarce resources 
when time, then add for innovation-value creation. 
 
Efficient allocation has a static and an inter-temporal dimension. The former can be 
achieved through perfectly competitive markets. The latter through innovations. 
Unlike static efficiency, however, perfect competition or perfect contestability (a 
market with free entry and costless exit) need not lead to intertemporal efficiency, as 
it removes the incentive to introduce innovations – the Schumpeterian reward of 
(transient) “excess profits”, see Baumol (1991). For Baumol (1991) the best type of 
market structure from the point of view of intertemporal efficiency is big-business 
competition. The potential presence of increasing returns, originally pointed to by 
Allyn Young (1928), suggests that imperfect market structures could well be 
inevitable, too.
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Despite such and other challenges, neoclassical economics and economists seem to 
share a belief that perfectly competitive markets and free trade can deliver the goods, 
eg Washington consensus, and lead to sustainable wealth-creation and convergence.  
 
Such challenges to neoclassical theory and the absence of an integrated classically 
flavoured conceptual framework requires, we feel, an attempt to put together static 
and inter-temporal efficiency, resource allocation, growth and co-ordination, to 
explain value and economic performance, see below. Before we turn to the issue of 
corporate governance.  
 
The (capitalist) firm, especially the joint stock, public limited corporation, is the 
organisation par-excellence in the history of humankind, in its ability to create and 
appropriate value and wealth.  Who controls, or should control, it; how they do so; 
for what reason; and with what effect, in terms not only of their own objectives, but 
also those of the firm, and national and global economic prosperity, is accordingly of 
paramount importance.   
 
Extant economic debates on corporate governance have been surprisingly narrow in 
focus, dealing with the issue of intra-firm alignment of incentives between 
shareholders and managers, in the context of a separation of ownership from 
management.  Management-oriented theories, such as ‘stakeholder’ and 
‘stewardship’ theories (see Clarke, 2004, for readings) have dealt with broader 
issues, yet have failed to  adequately draw on extant theory of the firm, value-
creation and (thus) (shareholder or stakeholder) value; we address this limitation 
here.   
 
Three major theories of the firm have been developed within economics.  First, the 
mainstream neoclassical theory, in which the firm itself is a ‘black box’, a 
transformer of inputs into outputs.  In this approach, the objective of ‘the firm’ is to 
maximise profits by equating marginal costs to marginal revenues.  As the firm has 
no “insides” ‘and full information and productive efficiency are assumed, the only 
corporate governance issue is ensuring that profits are being maximised. 
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In his classic article on transaction costs, Coase (1937) defined the firm as a multi-
person hierarchy, its nature lying in the ‘employment contract’ between employers 
and employees, and went on to explain the ‘employment contract’ in terms of 
transaction-costs-related market failures. He regarded savings in transaction costs by 
firms as the reason why labourers ‘agreed’ to work under the authority or direction of 
the employer.   
 
Coase’s analysis complements the neoclassical view of value by pointing to 
‘governance-mix’ related cost saving, thus efficiency gains.  However, similar to the 
neo-classical perspective, transaction costs analysis takes technology and innovation 
as data.  It thus fails to explain long-term value creation. 
 
In Penrose’s (1959) resource-based perspective, firms are seen as real organisations, 
consisting of human and non-human resources, under administrative co-ordination 
and authoritative communication. Human, and especially managerial, resources are 
most important. Resources provide multiple potential services. Firms use their 
resources to perform activities that result in products for sale in the market for a 
profit. The performance of activities within firms creates knowledge through 
specialization, division of labour, teamwork and learning.  The cohesive shell of the 
organisation is of essence in facilitating learning. These increase productivity, giving 
rise to ‘excess resources’. As excess resources can provide services at (near) zero 
marginal cost, they motivate managers- entrepreneurs to apply them to new 
activities, engendering endogenous innovation and growth, thus value creation. This 
can be seen as an efficiency/production-based complement to the Coasean insight. 
 
In all, transaction costs and resource-based theories help explain value generation by 
firms.  But why shareholder value?  This is explained by Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972).  They observed that in any team effort, where individual output is difficult to 
measure, team members may ‘shirk’.  This requires a monitor, who better be self-
monitored (to avoid needing a monitor of the monitor, etc.) by being a residual 
claimant (receiver of profits).  Owners (shareholders) are best suited for this purpose, 
as they have invested in firm-specific assets.  Therefore shareholder value is of 
critical importance.  It is threatened by the alleged separation of ownership from   7 
control, which leads to the need to align incentives between owner-shareholders and 
managers.    
 
The issue of the separation of ownership from management has been considered by 
Berle and Means (1932).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) discussed the issue of 
‘agency’ between owners and management.  The problem is that both ideas (of 
owners being the residual claimants, and of the separation of ownership from 
control) are dubious.  Workers also invest in firm-specific assets.  And a ‘managerial 
revolution’ may be non-existent or of no significance. 
 
In the work of Berle and Means (1932) and subsequent (managerialist) literature it 
was suggested that, given high ownership dispersion through the issuing of shares, 
owners are left without sufficient shares to warrant control, which is now left with 
the managers.  Assuming that managers maximize a different utility function to the 
owners (who are assumed to maximize profits), firms’ objectives might have been 
changed, thus shareholder value threatened.  This need s a solution to the ‘agency’ 
issue involved, to re-establish shareholder value. 
 
There are various problems with the above argument.  They concern for example, the 
empirical validity of the phenomenon, what ownership percentage suffices to give 
control to a cohesive group, how do we identify such cohesive groups, to what extent 
does dispersion imply a lower share ownership percentage for owners’ control?  Such 
considerations did raise doubts on the importance and extent of management control 
(Scott, 1986). 
 
A second problem concerns the constraints managers face in pursuing their aims.  A 
number of such constraints have been suggested in the literature: the market for 
corporate control (Manne, 1965), the managerial compensation market (Fama, 1980) 
as well as the monitoring and bonding by shareholders and debt-holders, etc. The 
implication is that there may be sufficient constraints to ensure that managers 
interests will be closely aligned with those of the shareholders. 
 
A third line of criticism comes from observation of the dramatic concentration of 
share ownership in the hands of financial institutions, pension funds, merchant banks   8 
and insurance companies (Scott, 1986). Such concentration is claimed to constrain 
managerial objectives further since, unlike small level shareholders, institutional 
investors can have the knowledge, the ability and the size of ownership stakes 
required to restrain management. All these point to the idea that companies are 




The above discussion leads to some uncomfortable conclusions.  First, the focus on 
‘agency’ between ‘owners’ and ‘managers’ is far too narrow.  Second, the ‘agency’ 
between ‘employers’ and ‘employees’ is hardly mentioned.  Given extensive 
discussion of the importance of human resources in wealth-creation in economics 
and management (see, for example Pfeffer, 1998, for extensive evidence), this is 
unsatisfactory.  Third, the link between corporate governance and shareholder value 
is also tenuous, as it is predicated on the assumption of an exogenous profit 
maximisation objective on the part of all owners (assumed to be residual claimants), 
and the related heroic assumption that this is reflected in sustainable share price and 
dividend growth.
2  Fourth, there is no satisfactory theory of intertemporal value 
creation (notably through innovation) and capture  in the neoclassical literature,  
while Penrose’s theory of innovation and value-creation ignores ‘agency’ – we try to 
address these problems below. 
 
III. The Determinants and Actors of Sustainable Value-Wealth Creation and 
the Role of Governance 
 
Wealth is realised value, expressed in price terms.  In a capitalist economy, value is 
created at the level of production by firms. It is then realised in exchange through the 
sale of commodities in markets for a profit. Scarcity affects value, but so does the 
cost of production. The efficient use of scarce resources, notably time, can be 
instrumental in increasing productivity. The (infra)structure of the firm (organisation 
management, systems), and its strategy (corporate governance), its technology and 
                                                 
1 The recent (institutional) “shareholder revolt”, notably the Carlton case, is a case in point! 
2 For example, The Economist, 28 June 2003, recently also summarised the problems with this 
assumption.   9 
innovativeness, the quantity-quality, and relations of its human resources (managers, 
entrepreneurs, labour), its ability to exploit unit cost economies (such as economies 
of scale, scope, learning, growth, transaction costs and external) are other important 
determinants of productivity, see Pitelis (1998).  They are affected by the external 
environment. This comprises three layers. First, the meso-environment, which is 
industry conduct and structure and the consequent industry “degree of monopoly”.  
The ‘degree of monopoly’ serves to realise value by determining the price-cost 
margin of the industry, see Cowling (1982).  The meso-level also includes locational 
aspects and the regional milieu to include the regions' “social capital”, see Putnam 
(1993). The four determinants at the firm level in their interrelationship with the 
‘external meso environment’ determine productivity-value at the industry, sectoral 
and regional levels. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Moving outwards, the macro-environment, which includes the macroeconomic 
policy mix and the nature and level of effective demand, impact upon the context 
within which firms and industry operate and determines the current “size of the 
market”, and (thus) the value that can be realised at any point in time. The very outer 
ring includes the institutional context and in particular the “governance-mix”, which 
is the “market-hierarchy-cooperation” mix of economic governance.  The 
institutional environment is crucial.  It provides “sanctions and rewards”, culture and 
attitudes and the overall “rules of the game” (North, 1991). The “governance-mix” 
determines the overall efficiency of the mode through which the whole economy 
operates. 
 
The attached ‘wheel of the nation’ is finally influenced by the global context.  This is 
the sum of each nation’s ‘wheel’, their synergies, and the institutions and 
organisations of global governance.  These impact upon the size of the global market, 
and the overall ability of ‘The Earth’ to generate value and wealth. 
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The capitalist firm has centre stage in the wheel for its ability to create value-wealth.  
Another important ‘actor’ is the government.   It may, and does, influence the 
institutional and macroeconomic context, through laws, regulations, ‘leadership’ etc. 
It can affect the meso-environment through its competition, industrial and regulation 
policies and the macro-environment through its macroeconomic policies. It can 
impart upon the determinants of productivity and value and wealth, through 
education and health policies, the provision of national infrastructure, its policies on 
innovation and “social capital”. 
A guide to the institutional and organisational configurations and conducts most 
amenable to productivity-value creation, can be provided through the identification 
of each actor’s respective capabilities and competences.  Firms are relatively “better” 
in production, markets in exchange and states in ideology, particularly in the forms 
of legitimacy. Small firms can have advantages in flexibility, large ones in unit cost 
economies. Inter-firm cooperation, eg in clusters, can enjoy some unit costs 
economies and induce innovativeness.  
 
Concerning ‘governance’ and ‘agency’, our analysis suggests a more complex 
hierarchy of ‘agencies’ and thus in turn the need for the solution to the problem of 
objective alignment.  Starting first from the controlling group of the firm (here, the 
‘agent’) and the corporation as an entity comprising of the sum of its stakeholders 
(here, the ‘principal’), it can be that the pursuit of personal interests by the former 
compromise those of the latter.  This, for example, is the case when the former 
pursue strategies that favour short-term, share valuation growth and personal 
compensation packages and perks, which are beyond those required to provide them 
with adequate incentives to pursue the interest of the corporation as a whole, that is, 
sustainable value creation and capture.  This undermines sustainability of the 
corporation as a whole and has legitimately led to the extensive focus of recent 
corporate governance debates on this issue.   
 
The second layer is that of the corporation as the agent and the government as the 
principal.  The ability of firms to realize value-wealth can, and often does, lead them 
to attempt to appropriate wealth as ‘rent’ through monopolistic and restrictive 
practices.  A high degree of market power can thwart incentives to innovation and be 
inimical to productivity and value-creation.    11 
 
In this context, the government (and its governance) becomes crucial.   Sustainable 
productivity value-wealth creation requires competition and regulation policies that 
thwart the creation and use of monopoly power (while allowing for an innovations-
inducing  “degree of monopoly”), and adopt policies to support small firm creation 
and survival and regional clusters.  
 
In the third layer, nations themselves (now the agents) can try to capture wealth by 
adopting strategic trade policies that can harm the process of global wealth creation.  
The aim of the ‘global community’ (now the ‘principal) should be to require 
individual governments to adopt policies that enhance global productivity and value-
wealth creation.  Indicatively, governments of developed economies should refrain 
from policies that restrain trade, yet recognise the need of developing countries to  
‘foster’ infant firms and industries, for their expected competition, innovation and 
productivity effects.  
 
Going back to the ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ relationship, it is clear that disaffected 
labour is likely to be less productive (Pfeffer, 1998), which may undermine the very 
purpose of the corporation and its controllers.  In this context, employees become a 
privileged ‘stakeholder’.  This is not just because employees too invest in firm-
specific assets (as do shareholders), but also notably because they are a crucial 
determinant of a firm’s ability to exist. 
 
The absence of global knowledge (and a global monitor) calls for diversity.  In any 
country or society, a host of other organisations and institutions exist – the family, 
the church, NGOs, and (even!) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – that can affect, in 
their interaction, the ability of firms’ and governments’ incentives to play the 
productivity and value-wealth enhancement game.  In this context the issue is the 
specialization and division of labour of alternative institutions and organisations, 
based on their relative advantages and competencies in production, exchange, 
legitimacy, ideology and culture, and the identification of institutional and 
organisational configurations and conducts that promote efficiency in the form of 
enhanced productivity, value and wealth.  Competition and co-operation, self-interest   12 
and altruism, big businesses and smaller co-operating firms in clusters, can all impact 
on the goal of productivity-value improvements. 
 
Sustainability of productivity and value-wealth-creation has implications for 
environmental, distribution and social policies, including migration, which also 
follow endogenously from our proposed perspective. Excessive inequities in 
distribution, the abuse of the environment, the exodus of educated human resources, 
can thwart a country's ability to sustainably generate wealth. Policies designed to 
deal with such problems are also part of a government's remit, with a proviso. 
Governments should make use of market prices to render the actions of “offenders” 
expensive (e.g. tax pollutants, require emigrants to developed countries to return 
public funds-subsidies provided for their education, etc). The use of non-market 
measures should in general be avoided: it thwarts incentives, and leads to the path of 
authoritarianism, with predictable consequences.   In the absence of a “Dr Pangloss”, 
an approximate way of effecting sustainable wealth creation is through the free 
interplay, pluralism and diversity of institutions, organisations, individuals, ideas, 
cultures, religions, norms, customs and civilizations, as each can serve, in part, as a 
‘steward’ or ‘monitor’ for the others. Having said this, it is crucial that this process is 
“managed”, “guided”, and “moulded” through informed agency, so that democracy is 
married to performance.  This brings our discussion of ‘governance’ centre-stage. 
 
For (corporate) governance to contribute towards sustainable value and wealth 
creation, internal and also external controls are required, including national and 
global incentives and sanctions.  Importantly, it is necessary to eliminate corruption 
at all levels: intra-firm, intra-country (regulatory capture) between host governments 
and multinationals, and internationally.  All these presuppose a degree of trust, social 
capital and the ‘ethical dimension’. Exclusive focus on self-interest may well be the 
strongest foe of sustainability. As a recent Economist (June 18, 2003) points out, 
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Extant views of (shareholder) value, (corporate) governance and competition have a 
narrow view of ‘agency’ and a poorly developed theory of (shareholder) value.  They 
also pay little attention to sustainability.  We suggested that a more comprehensive 
theory of value creation and appropriation requires a synthesis of resource allocation 
and resource creation, and developed a perspective on the determinants of value-
wealth creation at the firm, meso-, and national levels.  We have then explored the 
limitations of extant theory of the firm, concerning governance and value in its 
context, and explored some prerequisites of sustainability.  We concluded that the 
pursuit of (appropriately defined) shareholder (here equals stakeholder) value is not 
antithetical to, but it derives from, the notion of sustainability. Sustainability requires 
both internal and external controls, to include the market, but also hierarchy (firm 
and state), institutional and global controls. Institutional diversity and pluralism can 
help effect mutual ‘stewardship’ and monitoring.  For sustainable value creation, 
corporate governance needs to be aligned to national and global governance.  
Eliminating corruption at all levels is a crucial prerequisite.  All these have important 
implications for policy.   14 
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Figure 1 - The determinants of productivity, value and wealth at the firm, meso 
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